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JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
This Essay examines the emergence of global airline alliances in the mid-
1 990s. Created through a series of strategic relationships, alliances enable
airlines to enter markets across the world traditionally denied to them
under bilateral air service agreements. The decision of the Australian
Trade Practices Commission in March 1995 granting Qantas Airways
Ltd. (Qantas) and British Airways Plc. (BA) the right to jointly set fares
and services on the Sydney-London route raises competitive issues for car-
riers on the route as well as other carriers competing in the Asia Pacific
Region. This Essay will discuss the nature of airline alliances and the
regulatory regime in which they seek to operate. The Essay will also dis-
cuss codesharing. The Essay will conclude with the view that while
Qantas is Australia's principal carrier in the Asia Pacific Region,
whether it achieves global status or remains a regional carrier will depend
upon the success of its alliance with BA in the long term as well as the
outcome of the Qantas privatization which occurred in August 1995.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE PURPOSE OF this Essay is to examine the emergence of
global aviation alliances and the position Qantas Airways
Ltd. (Qantas) enjoys with its alliance partner British Airways Plc.
(BA) in an increasingly competitive market, particularly in the
Asia Pacific Region. These arrangements are of particular rele-
vance given the recent sale of Qantas. At the time of this writ-
ing, 75% of Qantas' equity has been placed in the world's
commercial markets. Local and international financial institu-
tions have responded favorably with the allotment to the Austra-
lian general public being fully subscribed and overseas
commercial interests oversubscribing the 49% limit to the ex-
tent of 51.3%.1
This Essay will analyze the development of international air-
line alliances, the major participants, the advantages and disad-
vantages of such relationships, and Qantas-BA's competitors in
the Asia Pacific Region. The Essay will conclude with the view
that the new alliance between Air New Zealand, Singapore Air-
lines, Ansett International, Lufthansa, and United Airlines will
challenge the Qantas-BA partnership, not only in the Asia Pa-
cific Region, but in the future on a global scale.
Carolyn Cummins, Qantas Price Falls as Foreign Investors Rise, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Aug. 3, 1995, at 47.
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II. INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE ALLIANCES
The objective of an airline alliance is to create between two or
more carriers a seamless integration of standards, products, and
services for the benefit of the traveller. The aim is to add value
to the products and services of each partner airline while at the
same time achieving economies of scale in reducing costs and
unnecessary duplication.' For example, it allows the alliance
partners to operate more efficient and flexible reservation and
ticketing systems, which in turn permit passengers to transfer
from one international partner carrier to another at a desig-
nated international terminal without delay or a diminution of
standards or service. Alliances are the new generation of mar-
keting partnerships between airlines cooperating their networks
to provide global reach.3
The alliance involves participating partners accessing reserva-
tion systems for the history of a loyal traveller, treating them as a
"customer or client," and rewarding them with benefits includ-
ing special car rental rates, hotel accommodations, or bonus
points on the airline's frequent flyer programs. The airlines un-
dertake to issue boarding passes promptly by combining speedy
and efficient baggage check-ins, handling, and collections, espe-
cially on interline services with partner airlines. Loyal clients are
encouraged to use the airline's designated club lounge facilities
which provide world TV news, business and information service
centres, and selected entertainment.
III. TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES
Alliances consist of two categories, equity alliances where air-
lines take equity or part ownership in other carriers, and joint
venture alliances where the arrangements between airlines are
limited to specific objectives. The former alliances are wide-
ranging, while the latter have route specific marketing arrange-
ments. In each case the alliances contain ajoint marketing com-
ponent. Alliances are predicated on the basis that airlines are
required to maximize market penetration worldwide in order to
enhance profits for co-partners and shareholders with minimum
exposure to negative effects.
Views differ as to the number of alliances. One view suggests
there are in excess of 401 alliances in the world, 133 of which
2 Jacqueline Gallacher, Bagging the Benefits, AIRLINE Bus., July 1994, at 45.
3 Jan Ernst C. de Groot, Code-Sharing, 19 AIR & SPACE L. 62, 62 (1994).
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involve intercontinental links.4 This is double the number four
years earlier.5 Approximately 70% of alliances are national or
regional in nature, providing smaller airlines with access to the
larger carrier's hub airports.6 The Boston Consulting Group, in
their examination of 200 alliances globally in force in 1991, sug-
gests that 107 have collapsed. Equity alliances were three times
more likely to succeed than non-equity alliances.8 In the case of
regional alliances, the Boston Consulting Group considered that
80% of alliances were successful.9 Intercontinental alliances
were likely to have a success rate of 77%."°
Central to the alliance is the approval of both the carrier's
country and the host country under a bilateral agreement which
permits traffic rights to be established between the parties."l
The commercial aspects of the alliances can only operate be-
tween the respective partner airlines where a bilateral agree-
ment has previously been entered into by their respective
national governments. This is generally not an issue. Tradition-
ally, most international carriers (other than those in the United
States) have either been owned by their national government or
privatized, such as BA in 1989. Alternatively, many airlines are
now in the process of being either fully or partly privatized, as is
the case in Europe with Lufthansa, Sabena, and Swissair. On
July 19, 1995, it was announced that Swissair's purchase of
49.5% in the Belgium carrier Sabena had been approved by the
European Commission.12 Since codesharing is a precondition
to the formation of international alliances, an understanding of
their origins and importance is necessary.
IV. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY: BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
AND CODESHARING
The practice of codesharing between international airlines
arises from the relationship established under bilateral air ser-
4 Formation Flying, AusTL., July 26, 1995, at 32.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Alan Deans, Airline Pacts'Record not a Good Omen for Qantas, AUSTL. FIN. REV.,




11 See generally de Groot, supra note 3.




vice agreements, referred to as "air service agreements" or ASAs.
These agreements have their origin in the Chicago Convention
of 1944 (Convention). The Convention confirmed the funda-
mental principles of (a) the sovereign state's control over all
navigation within territorial limits and (b) the independent, bi-
lateral negotiation of international air service arrangements.
The Convention also established the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), which under article 37 had the objective
of adopting uniform international standards of air safety, regu-
larity, and efficiency of aviation. The Convention provided the
legal basis for the creation of bilateral air service agreements
among nation states through which air carriers could operate."3
Under articles 1 and 2, the Convention established "complete
and exclusive sovereignty" over the territorial air space of each
state, drawing upon the sentiments expressed in the Paris Con-
ference of 1919.14 The Convention recognized the fundamental
importance of such a concept to the future of commercial avia-
tion. The Convention also required that permission or authori-
zation be obtained before scheduled or non-scheduled
commercial international air services could operate over or into
the territory of a contracting state. 15 The Convention con-
firmed that such international aircraft would have the national-
ity of the state in which it was registered, and that as a matter of
principle dual nationality would be excluded. 6
The signatories to the Convention undertook to enforce their
own "rules of the air" which would also apply above the "High
Seas."17 Similarly, enforcement would exist in relation to a
state's passports, immigration, customs, and health, as well as
the right to search an aircraft.1 8 It should be noted that the im-
plication of the right of state sovereignty carries with it the de-
sire by most states that their own airline companies satisfy the
demand for air transport to and from their own countries inde-
pendently. "[Governments] show a strong tendency to impose
major limitations on foreign airline companies... [which] may
1s GARY N. HEILBRONN, TRAVEL AND TOURISM LAW IN AusrRALIA AND NEW ZEA-
LAND 124 (1992).
14 Id. at 121.
15 Id. at 121-22.
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affect the number of passengers to be carried, the flight fre-
quency and other vital matters."1 9
The right of nation states to permit greater freedom of move-
ment has been made in two agreements which are annexed to
the Convention and which divide the Freedoms of the Air into
five categories. ° Other writers extend the freedoms to the
sixth, seventh, and eighth freedoms.2 1 The Freedoms of the Air
fall into two categories, Technical Rights and Traffic Rights, and
were established under the International Air Service Transit
Agreement (JASTA).22 The first two freedoms were extended by
each contracting nation to the other by the Transit Agreement
(also known as the Two-Freedoms Agreement) .23 The Interna-
tional Air Transport Agreement,24 known as the Transport
Agreement or the Five-Freedoms Agreement, contained the
third, fourth, and fifth freedoms 25 that were debated at the Chi-
cago Convention but which were not settled on a multi-national
basis as originally envisaged. These freedoms have been subse-
quently negotiated on a bilateral basis between nations.
Briefly, the five freedoms are as follows:
(a) The First Freedom. The right to fly across the territory of
another nation without landing. 6
(b) The Second Freedom. The right to land for non-traffic pur-
poses (to refuel or to carry out repairs).7
(c) The Third Freedom. The right to disembark passengers,
mail, or cargo in another nation.28
(d) The Fourth Freedom The right to embark passengers, mail,
or cargo in another nation.29
(e) The Fifth Freedom. The right of an airline of one nation to
embark passengers, mail, and cargo in another nation and fly
19 I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 11 (4th rev.
ed. 1991).
20 Id. at 12.
21 WARREN PENGILLEY &JOHN MCPHEE, LAW FOR AVIATORS 240-41 (1994).
22 International Air Services Transit Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
23 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 10 n.3., 12.
24 International Air Transport Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 59
Stat. 1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
25 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 10 n.3, 12.






them to a third nation.3" It is these Fifth Freedom rights which
have been the source of a number of disputes concerning the
Australian Government and its national carrier Qantas, most no-
tably in respect to capacities and the carriage of passengers with
Northwest Airlines, Air New Zealand, and most recently Cathay
Pacific.3'
The other freedoms, referred to as the sixth, seventh, and
eighth freedoms, are as follows:
(a) The Sixth Freedom. The right of a nation's airline to carry
traffic between two other nations via an airport in its own
country.32
(b) The Seventh Freedom. The right of one airline of one nation
to carry passengers on stand alone services between two other
nations.33
(c) The Eighth Freedom. The right of one nation's airline to
carry origin and destination traffic within the borders of an-
other nation ("cabotage").
In the view of one noted author, the last three freedoms are
simply minor variations of the first five.35
V. POOLING, INTERLINE COOPERATION,
AND ALLIANCES
Cooperation between domestic airlines and international car-
riers is not a new concept. Over the years, and for a range of
commercial reasons, airlines have entered pooling arrange-
ments, coordinating flight programs and sharing the proceeds.3 6
The Scandinavian Airline System (SAS) formed cooperative ar-
rangements in which Sweden, Norway, and Denmark partici-
pated. 7 Similarly ATLAS, consisting of Air France, Alitalia,
Lufthansa, and Sabena, formed consortiums for the purpose of
purchasing aircraft and maintenance services.38 Agreements
also exist among airlines for the interchange of aircraft and crew
SO Id.
S Chris Falvey, Judge Urges Extension of HK Airline's Permit, WEEKEND AUSTL.,
June 10-11, 1995, at 6.
32 PENGILLEY & MCPHEE, supra note 21, at 240.
33 Id.
4 Id. at 241.
35 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 13.
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for short or long-term periods.3 9 This practice is known as "wet
leasing" where it involves using another airline's crew, or "dry
leasing" where the arrangement is limited to the aircraft.4 °
However, in the mid-1990s, airline alliances are characterized
by greater complexity. In the United States, these alliances have
taken the form of partnerships or alliances involving codeshar-
ing,joint marketing, equity investment, or a combination of one
or more of these factors.
VI. DEREGULATION AND CODESHARING IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The major U.S. carriers developed in the 1970s and 1980s.
Originally, codesharing arrangements evolved in the United
States to achieve economies of scale in the provision of airline
services by larger carriers operating out of major airport centres
to remote locations using regional or feeder aircraft. It was un-
economical for the major airlines such as TWA, American Air-
lines, Delta, or United Airlines to fly these smaller destinations
below capacity. The cooperative interlining arrangement be-
tween large and small carriers reflected the "hub and spoke"
configuration which was emerging as a result of federal govern-
ment policy in the late 1970s.4 1 The strategy was aimed at meet-
ing the demand of airline traffic from cities such as New York,
Washington, D.C., Chicago, Dallas, and Los Angeles. In some
cases, the major airlines held equity in or owned the local
carriers.
A. DEREGULATION
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 in the United States was
significant in stimulating competition between the carriers and
allowing new competitors to enter the market. At the same
time, the economic incentive to increase in size, combined with
the government policy of permitting airlines to merge rather
than fail, increased the dominance of the major airlines. De-
spite the recession that began in 1979, air traffic between the
years 1978 and 1982 increased by more than 14% while seat
miles increased by 19%.42 In short, more people were flying and
39 Id. at 20.
40 Id.
41 ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AIRPORT REGULATION, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 26
(1991).
42 Id. at 24.
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"air travel was becoming democratized as the travel mode of the
masses rather than the elite."43 Consequently, airlines using the
hub and spoke model gained a multiplier effect from the
number of city-pairs they could serve with a given amount of
flight mileage. To maximize their position in the market, the
larger airlines recognized that greater aircraft capacity and a na-
tionwide network were necessary. As a result, by 1988 all but
four of the nation's airports were effective monopolies, with Chi-
cago, Atlanta, Dallas, and Denver, oligopolies." It was against
this background that codesharing began.
B. CODESHARING
Permission to create a codesharing arrangement exists on any
destination listed in a bilateral agreement. The International
Air Transport Association (IATA) assigns designator codes to
airlines that are used for reservations, schedules, telecommuni-
cations, legal documents, and other commercial and traffic pur-
poses. 41 It is a two-letter code identifying the carrier, followed
by a number corresponding to the flight and destination. 46 For
example, QF 11 signifies a Qantas Sydney-Los Angeles route,
and QF 324 signifies the Los Angeles-San Francisco portion of
the flight undertaken by one of Qantas's codeshare partners,
USAir.
Under arrangements to codeshare, the two-letter code may be
used on a flight operated by another carrier.47 This means that
carriers with their own code or combined designator codes can
sell seats on the same flights operated by the codesharing part-
ner.48 In attaching the same designator code to the connecting
flights, the partner is able to market both flights as if it were a
connecting flight to the same carrier.4 The difference is that
instead of interlining passengers from one air carrier to an-
other, there is the appearance of an on-line connection where
the passengers are transferred to the same carrier. 50 In this re-
43 Id.
- Id. at 26.
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spect, codesharing is a misnomer, as it is not the code that is
shared but the flight, that is, the carrier's capacity.5
The London Heathrow Succession Agreement in 1990 was a
significant step in the development of airline services. At that
time the United Kingdom received universal codesharing to the
United States in exchange for United Airlines and American
Airlines being allowed to replace Pan-AM and TWA as the U.S.
carriers at Heathrow. 52 Subsequently, BA's purchase of 24.6%
of USAir enabled it to enter the U.S. market.5
The main issue concerning the US-German bilateral agree-
ment was the creation of codesharing with six different formu-
las.54 It gave German airlines access to the U.S. domestic
markets and the U.S. airlines access to the German interior mar-
kets, together with access to third countries from Germany and
fifth freedom services between London and Frankfurt.55
It was the use of fifth freedom services which contrasted this
codeshare arrangement from the BA-USAir and the KLM-North-
west codesharing operations.56 The KLM-Northwest alliance is
the most highly developed codeshare in respect to beyond ac-
cess to third countries. 57 Consequently, this alliance is the sub-
ject of much criticism by countries such as Israel which, under
its bilateral agreement with the U.S., has no codesharing provi-
sions.5 8 The Israeli government was distressed to find that the
KLM-Northwest alliance assumed it could be a beyond-Amster-
dam point and characterized the arrangement as "an external
bilateral authority."59 As a matter of practice, bilateral agree-
ments do not make provisions for cooperative commercial rela-
tionships. 60  However, the United States appears to have
adopted in the latest US-Russian agreement a limited capacity to
codeshare destinations.61
51 Id. at 63.
52 Mead Jennings, The Code War, AIRLINE Bus., May 1994, at 12, 12-13.
53 Id.










VII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CODESHARING
In early 1994, the German bilateral negotiations were com-
pleted and marked the beginning of codesharing as an aero-
political issue.62 It seems that, from that time, codesharing
passed from a marginal marketing concept to a primary issue in
the designation of airline services.6"
The question remains unanswered at this stage as to whether
codesharing will become a tactical trend with limited objectives
or the first stage of liberalization in a new global aviation indus-
try. Recognizing the apparent advantages of codesharing, na-
tional governments may well seek to intervene and control
codesharing, given the authority they enjoy under bilateral
agreements. A trend is emerging where governments are using
the bilaterals to control the conditions under which carriers will
operate in the future. For example, in the case of Swissair and
Delta, the partners were only permitted to codeshare on the ba-
sis that they maintained separate finances, marketing, sales, and
pricing.64
The United States Department of Transportation has an-
nounced that it intends to amend its rules from requiring "rea-
sonable notice" to "actual compliance" as a condition for
approval of codesharing pacts. Codesharing, originally
designed as a marketing tool, may eventually be used as a polit-
ical tool by nations granting beyond rights over their country.6"
Codesharing alliances have expanded in recent years. Concur-
rently, the major carriers' ownership and use of computer reser-
vation systems (CRS) has enabled them, through the codeshare
device, to gain a competitive advantage in placing their names
on the screens of the CRS ahead of their smaller and possibly
more vulnerable opponents. 66 Codeshare flights appear on the
CRS as on-line connections which, in line with consumer prefer-
ence for on-line connections, are shown in the "primary display"
and given priority over interline connections shown in the "sec-
ondary display."67 "Because an agent is pressed for time and
62 de Groot, supra note 3, at 67-68.
63 Jennings, supra note 52, at 12.
64 de Groot, supra note 3, at 67.
65Jennings, supra note 52, at 14.
66 Beverly S. Parkhurst, Current Status of Legal Issues in the United States In-
volving Computer Airline Reservation Systems 24 (May 13-20, 1990) (presenta-
don to International Forum of Travel and Tourism Advocates, Sixth Annual
Conference, in Australia) (on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
67 Id.
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time means money, agents are more likely to try to book the
flight from the first primary screen."68
A central question facing the airline industry is whether
global alliances will remain tied to the present bilateral arrange-
ments. Because of the complexities arising from the growth and
proliferation of codesharing agreements among international
carriers, there is a need for a new formula to be devised involv-
ing multilateral agreements. This could take the form of a trade
block approach involving like-minded nations with the United
States and European Union (already multilateral) or perhaps
the United Kingdom taking the lead. The vice-president of
United Airlines has suggested a strategy for establishing a global
standard for codesharing agreements with the only restriction
being consumer notice requirements. 69 If such a policy is ac-
cepted by both carriers and governments, it could create an en-
vironment for a deregulated, global airline industry.7 °
Since the Qantas-BA alliance represents one of the more re-
cent global airline alliances which will affect its competitors on
the London-Sydney Kangaroo route as well as airlines within the
Asia Pacific Region, a brief analysis of the Qantas-BA alliance
follows.
A. THE QANTAS-BRITISH AiRWAYS ALLIANCE
The Qantas-British Airways alliance was formed in 1992. In
their official statement the partners announced:
In the evolving climate of inter-dependence in the aviation in-
dustry, the proposed partnership between British Airways and
Qantas is both attractive and logical, particularly given the air-
lines' complementary route structures and cultural compatibility.
An alliance would allow the airlines to offer a more compre-
hensive service to travellers and would provide the means for
Qantas to further boost its presence in its home region ....
It would also present both airlines with the opportunity to im-
prove their commercial performance by taking advantage of
their operational synergies and coordinating many functions and
activities. 7 '
- Id. at 23.
69 Jennings, supra note 52, at 14.
70 Id.
71 BRITIsH AIRWAYS, WE Go FURTHER TOGETHER-A NEW ERA FOR AUSTRALIAN
AVIATION 6 (1992) (statement of Colin Marshal, Deputy Chairman and Chief Ex-
ecutive of British Airways) (on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
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Following these commitments, the partners embarked on a se-
ries of initiatives to promote cooperation rather than competi-
tion through joint advertising and promotion, ground handling
and cargo operations, information management, capital equip-
ment, and quality assurance.
In October 1994, Qantas and BA announced a number of pol-
icy decisions to improve customer services levels and enhance
their relationship. Included in the statement was a provision for
increased codesharing, the use of Singapore and Bangkok air-
ports as major international hubs to permit the exchange of pas-
sengers at the midpoint of the UK-Australia service, and the
creation of greater capacity on the Sydney to London route
(Kangaroo route) on which thirty-two carriers competed. The
effect of this strategy was immediate, with Lufthansa and Air
France announcing their withdrawal from the route in October
1995.72 Due to changes in aircraft type, the airline partners of-
fered thirty-five flights per week, creating one thousand addi-
tional seats on the route. British Airways is responsible for
fourteen flights and Qantas for twenty-one. Codesharing, how-
ever, is not planned for this route.
Other strategies initiated by the alliance partners included
creating joint sales offices to actively market their products and
flights. It is calculated that the changes will ensure an estimated
$1.0 billion in joint revenues shared on a proportional basis.73
On November 17, 1994, the Australian Trade Practices Com-
mission (Commission), in an interim determination, stated that
the proposed route sharing and pricing policies on the Sydney-
London route constituted a breach of section 88(1) of the
Trade Practices Act of 1974. TM The Commission considered that
the partners' present arrangements amounted to "price fixing"
which would have a deleterious affect on the market and inhibit
competition.75 Qantas resubmitted its proposal in a modified
form in March 1995. It provided the Commission with addi-
tional information sufficient for it to grant an authorization in
favor of the alliance partners on the grounds that the public
benefits of competition outweighed any apparent anti-competi-
72 Linda Morris, Kanga's Kick Ousts Airline, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 5,
1995, at 10.
73 See Ian Thomas, Qantas, BA Join on Route to Europe, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 3,
1994, at 3.
74 Ian Thomas & Steve Lewis, TPC Strikes Again, AUSTL. FIN. REv., Nov. 18,
1994, at 1, 4.
75 See id. at 4.
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tive effects. 76 In the last nine months, the Qantas and BA alli-
ance appears to be operating effectively. However, its success
and profitability levels exist only to the extent that its competi-
tors are prepared not to compete directly in the same markets. 77
On a global scale, the KLM-Northwest alliance remains a major
competitor.
B. THE KLM-NORTHWEST AIRLINES ALLIANCE
Established in 1989, the Dutch airline KLM invested $400 mil-
lion in the purchase of Northwest's parent company, NWA Inc.,
recently renamed Northwest Airlines Corp. by Wings Holdings.
In 1990, Northwest's Atlantic route consisted of flights connect-
ing three cities in the United States to five destinations in Eu-
rope. 8 In 1991, Northwest and KLM entered ajoint venture to
carry traffic between Northwest's Minneapolis/St. Paul hub and
KLM's Amsterdam hub.79 In 1992, a similar transaction was ar-
ranged which included Northwest's largest hub in Detroit. 0 As
a result of the joint venture, traffic rose 10% more than other
transatlantic routes in the years 1992 to 1993 and doubled the
total industry traffic growth of 7%.s
At the same time, the United States and the Netherlands gov-
ernments' new bilateral agreement granted antitrust immunity
to Northwest and KLM from January 1, 1993, giving both air-
lines the opportunity to enhance their partnership.82 It is the
only alliance which has been granted such immunity by the
United States under a bilateral agreement. As previously stated,
within weeks of the grant of immunity, the KLM-Northwest alli-
ance was challenged by Israel, accusing KLM-Northwest of de-
ceptively advertising flights to Tel Aviv from New York when
Northwest did not offer a service from that market.83 Germany
also claimed that the alliance was predatory and attempted to
block Northwest's codeshare access to German cities by seeking
76 TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION, QANTAS AIRWAYS LIMITED AND BRITISH AIR-
WAYS PLC. TRADE PRACTICES DETERMINATION Vi (Mar. 1995).
77 Emiliya Mychasuk, TPC Go-ahead on Route-sharing a Boost for Qantas, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, May 13, 1995, at 27.
78 Bob Neidermire, Code-sharing and Scheduling Opportunities-The North-
west Experience 6 (Feb. 22, 1994) (presentation at Strategic Airline Marketing





83 Mead Jennings, A Sense of Stability, AIRLINE Bus., July 1994, at 50.
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a court injunction against it. Other complaints came from Tur-
key, Greece, and Saudi Arabia.8 4
In September 1994, Northwest added to its schedule KLM's
nonstop flights to Amsterdam from eight U.S. cities. The Man-
aging Director of Northwest Airlines in the Southeast Asian Re-
gion stated, "These joint venture flights represented the single
largest expansion ever of Northwest's service to Europe ... [to
the extent that] scheduled flights to Europe were nearly
doubled-from 70 to 136-without adding to industry over-ca-
pacity."85 The unique alliance between Northwest and KLM ap-
pears to be one of Northwest's strategic assets.
Northwest also gained fifth freedom rights to offer services to
Russia under the bilateral agreements in May 1993. The carrier
sought permission from the United States Department of Trans-
portation to operate to Moscow and St. Petersburg under a
codesharing agreement with KLM from August 1993. Moscow
would be serviced via Amsterdam and St. Petersburg via Amster-
dam and Helsinki, with no traffic rights between Helsinki and
St. Petersburg. KLM would operate the aircraft on the Amster-
dam-Moscow and Amsterdam-Helsinki-St. Petersburg segments.
Northwest also gained authority to operate U.S.-Amsterdam-Bu-
dapest flights under a codeshare with KLM.86
The alliance created significant cost savings and revenue earn-
ings and broadened the relationship from its original codeshar-
ing operation. Between 1990 and 1993, KLM's shared annual
operating benefits increased from $5 million to $160 million.87
Northwest believed its alliance pre-tax profits to be $30 mil-
lion.88 It is estimated that the total benefits could reach $150
million per carrier.89 The combined revenue in 1993 amounted
to $16 billion.90 The alliance carriers have recently agreed to
utilize joint paper stocks, shared terminal space, and reciprocal
ticket sales."
KLM and Northwest plan to merge their respective cargo op-
erations which is estimated to return to the partners $25 million
84 Id.
85 Neidermire, supra note 78, at 7.
86 Id.
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in alliance revenue. 92 In 1994, a jointly marketed World Busi-
ness Class product was established offering more comfort,
choice, and control to travellers. 93 Similarly, in January 1994,
the alliance produced a combined international fare sale that
discounted air tickets by 30% to the U.S., Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa.94
With the existing fifty codeshare points in the U.S. and
twenty-four beyond the Netherlands, codesharing opportunities
in the Pacific appear to be the next challenge. The two
codeshare carriers' schedules now meet each day at Northwest's
Asian hub in Tokyo, as well as Bangkok and Seoul, a KLM hub.95
Pricing initiatives developed in tandem by the carriers have
averted pro rate agreements.96 The KLM-Northwest formula for
dividing revenue based on the production costs for each carrier
appears unique.97 In 1994, Northwest received the award for
the best improvement in net results among world carriers. 98 In
seeking to merge their respective accounting systems, the part-
ners believe they have a competitive advantage over other alli-
ances.99 The only competitor facing KLM-Northwest at present
is the United-Lufthansa alliance.100 On September 14, 1994,
Fosters Brewing Group announced the sale of its 6% interest in
Northwest to KLM for $242 million. 10 1
C. THE SINGAPORE-DELTA-SWISSAIR ALLIANCE
Singapore Airlines, Delta Airlines, and Swissair developed a
marketing alliance in 1989. The aim of this alliance was to
strengthen each airline's operational capability to create a
global presence. Critics suggested that the combination of
three bilateral agreements would lead to an unbalanced alli-
ance. However, with joint cargo handling, the alliance enabled
Singapore Airlines to maintain its preeminent position with
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Singapore Airlines (SIA) was privatized in 1985. SIA estab-
lished effective route strategies, cost efficient operations with
modern carriers, and a cohesive labor management relation-
ship. In addition, SIA has preferential tax treatment for its air-
lines. Other reasons for the airline's success include efficient
management, an effective long haul route network, a hub cen-
tral to the Asia-Pacific market, and the location of its operations
at one of the most modem airports in the world. The airline
has acquired an image of quality and enjoys the support of a
government that offers liberal traffic rights and airport facilities.
Yet SIA's yields are falling. Costs are increasing as skilled la-
bor becomes more expensive. The airline has experienced four
years of declining profits. In the half year ending September
1994, SIA announced a 15% rise in pre-tax profits.1 0 3 Earnings
per share increased by 18% to 35.9¢ per share and net profit
rose 18% to $461 million.10 4 SIA's revenue for the period April
to September 1994 increased by 7% to $3.25 billion from the
previous comparative period.10 5 It is estimated that SIA will
grow at the rate of 8% per year offering more capacity in the
year 2000 than British Airway's current capacity. However, an
issue of concern for SIA in the future remains-the establish-
ment of new traffic rights within a small home market.
In 1993-1994, SIA attained profits of U.S. $648 million after
tax which was an increase of 14.5% over the previous year.10 6
This was achieved, according to SIA's chairman J. Y. Pillay, as a
result of productivity improvements "through investment in re-
sources-whether in facilities, equipment, aircraft or people."10 7
Significant gains have also been achieved during the tendering
process for new aircraft because of the competition between air-
craft and engine manufacturers for SIA's business."0 8 By operat-
ing a young fleet with modern aircraft, SIA is able to optimize
fuel efficiency, minimize maintenance costs, and ensure sus-
10s Singapore Profits Up, GuARDLAN, Oct. 24, 1994, at 12.
104 Conrad Raj, SIA Earnings Soar 18% to $461M at Half Time, Bus. TIMES, Oct.
24, 1994, at 1.
105 Id.
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tained reliability of its flights, which results in lower investment
in spares and support facilities. 0 9
As a result of profit sharing agreements with unions, SIA staff
productivity rose an average of 8% per employee during 1994
bringing with it improvements across the board."10 Neverthe-
less, capacity was expected to slow from 10.3% in 1994 to 9% in
1995-1996.111
SIA is also a major competitor in the Asia and South Pacific
Region. SIA has a hub located at the gateway to Asia and is posi-
tioned to actively compete for market share in the Asian region
against its rivals. SIA's recent alliance with Delta Airlines and
Swissair now places it within the global aviation market and,
hence, a major competitor of Qantas.
2. Delta Airlines
Delta Airlines (DA) established a relationship with United Air-
lines and American Airlines in 1984 which permitted them to
achieve an effective marketing presence in the United States
and abroad. DA operates in Asia, Central America, and Europe.
It serves twenty-six cities in thirteen countries and has the largest
computer reservation system (CRS) through WorldSpan. The
airline is ranked third in the world for total revenue tonne km,
second in relation to the total number of passengers carried,
and third in respect to revenue from passenger km."
12
The partners, in seeking their goal of a profitable and bal-
anced alliance, recognize their relative dependency position
within the relationship and coordinate corporate strategy. The
criteria for continued success now includes prudent financial
management; effective human resource policies and labor rela-
tions; a common plan for creating new business; extensive net-
works serving the airlines business; and a reputation for
customer service.
3. Equity of the Partners
The limitations of ownership are based on the financial
strength of each partner and fixed at no more than 5% of each
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rectly influenced by prevailing exchange rates between U.S. cur-
rency and other currencies.
The partners introduced Global Excellence logos for specific
alliance products, including round the world fares, joint fre-
quent flyer programs, joint sale promotions, pro rata fares, and
50% discounts in Comfort Class. In technology, the partners
now share maintenance facilities at nominated airports, spare
parts, joint development on cargo and warehousing, and the
purchase of aircraft from the same manufacturers.
Similarly, the partners entered into agreements to purchase
eighty McDonnell Douglas MD1is over five years to enhance
cockpit and passenger configurations, improve the use of their
carriers on feeder routes, and reduce wasted parking time due
to time zone differences and scheduling limitations.
In October 1993, DA, having invested $556 million in the Pan
Am Corporation's trans-Atlantic franchise, entered a codeshare
alliance with the German carrier Lufthansa.11 3 DA anticipated
that the alliance would provide $30 to $40 million in added rev-
enue during 1995.114 It was unfortunate for DA that with the
withdrawal of Pan Am from the Atlantic route, the new Air Serv-
ices Agreement between the United States and the United King-
dom did not permit DA to take up Pan Am's rights of access to
Heathrow terminal, used by forty-eight million people per
year.' 15
4. Swissair
Swissair (SR) has a reputation for punctuality, service, and a
high standard of cuisine. 1 16 Despite improved levels of capacity,
SR had a pre-tax loss of $50 million during the first half of
1994.11 Only SR's profit from its hotels and catering operations
enabled the company to remain profitable." 8 Last year, SR re-
ported earnings of $46 million on operating revenues of $4.9
billion.119
With the object of ensuring profitability in the future, SR em-
barked on a series of cost reduction measures including job
1S Mead Jennings, Standing Your Ground, AIRLINE Bus., May 1994, at 30.
114 Id. at 31.
"5 Id. at 33.
116 John Tagliabue, Swissair Flies the Unfriendly Skies of United Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
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shedding.1 21 SR is expected to reduce its workforce by at least
four thousand out of a total payroll of twenty-five thousand per-
sonnel over the next three years. 121 Food and aircraft cleaning
have been contracted out.122 The goal is to increase productivity
by reducing labor costs, which amount to 36% of revenue.
1 21
Airlines that have resolved their labor problems are operating in
the range of only 25% to 30%.124 SR currently faces the task of
gaining a secure niche in a rapidly changing European mar-
ket.125 SR was permitted entry to the European Union in July
1995.
VIII. AIRLINE DEREGULATION IN EUROPE
The deregulation of the airline industry in Europe is similar
to the experience in the United States in the 1980s. The date
for an open skies policy in Europe was January 1, 1997.126 Com-
petition is increasing as the European Union countries move
into markets once denied to them. 127 British Airways has estab-
lished subsidiaries in France and Germany (Deutsche BA) and
announced direct flights from Rome to Paris.1 28 Conversely,
there is pressure on the European airlines to privatize without
delay. Lufthansa, a major competitor of Swissair, is selling 51%
of its stock to the public, leaving the German Government as a
minority shareholder with approximately 32%. 129
At the same time, the European Commission announced the
clearance of the agreement under which Swissair will invest $6.5
billion (BEF) in Sabena as part of a BEF $10 billion capital injec-
tion, buying back the 37% share previously held by Air
France." ° Swissair will acquire 49.5% of Sabena with the option
to buy additional shares only when European Union rules on
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Alitalia and Air France are due to privatize in 1996-1997.13"
However, the accumulated losses of both carriers will make it a
difficult task. The dilemma facing the European Union mem-
bers is that policies exist to ensure free market competition in
the airline industry; however, national preferences and econo-
mies may well create a different agenda. Alitalia, which has ex-
perienced six consecutive years of losses and debts of $1.2
billion, is close to bankruptcy.1 3 3
In the first nine months of 1994, the European Union ap-
proved government aid of $7.4 billion to state-operated carriers,
including Portugal's TAP, Olympic Airlines, and Aer Lingus.1 34
The largest payment was to Air France of $3.7 billion. 135 Yet pay-
ments of state aid are not available to Swissair, which is privately
owned.1 3 6 The challenge facing Swissair, particularly as a mem-
ber of the Singapore Airlines-Delta Airlines alliance, is maintain-
ing its market share in Europe. 137 The experience of the
Alcazar meetings in 1993 demonstrated how national govern-
ments will react when national pride is at stake. In this instance,
the countries' representatives failed to agree on the location of
the headquarters site and the apportionment of job redundan-
cies which was intended to link Swissair with three other Euro-
pean carriers, KLM, Austrian Airlines, and SAS, the
Scandinavian Airlines System.13 8
According to recent announcements, Swissair will still be ex-
cluded access to the European Union since the European Com-
mission advised that any effort to take control of the Brussels-
based carrier would invalidate Sabena's status as an EU
airline. 139
The central question facing the international airline industry
is whether global alliances supported by equity interests can of-
fer security in such a turbulent environment. For example,
Scandinavian Airlines lost its equity in Continental Airlines
when the U.S. carrier filed for bankruptcy. KLM also wrote
down its investment in Northwest Airlines. BA's investment of
$400 million in USAir is of concern to BA's shareholders, and
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the outcome of negotiations with USAir's unionized employees
remains uncertain. 140 The chairman of BA anticipates that the
benefits of the partnership will continue to accrue as illustrated
by the profit gained through traffic feed, joint frequent flyer
programs, and cost and facility sharing amounting to $27.2 mil-
lion for BA and $5.6 million for USAir.1 41
IX. THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION
In the Pacific Region, Qantas Airlines has been a dominant
carrier alongside Air-NZ which together account for more than
50% of the traffic across the Pacific. At various times since the
1970s, U.S. carriers such as Pan Am, American Airlines, Conti-
nental Airlines, Northwest, and more recently United Airlines,
have offered regular services to the United States. United Air-
lines is the only remaining U.S. carrier on the route alongside
Air Pacific, Air-NZ, and Qantas. However, economic growth in
the Asian market in the last five years has ensured that Qantas's
strategic planning includes links to all the major capital cities in
the region. The new markets include China, Indonesia, and
Vietnam. At the same time, the development of new alliances by
other carriers (that is, Air NZ, Singapore Airlines, Ansett Austra-
lia, and the Lufthansa-United Airlines and Thai International
alliance) is of concern to the Australian carrier.
A. AIR NEW ZFAIAND
The Sydney-Los Angeles route has not been a profitable one
for the airlines that cross the Pacific Ocean. This fact was evi-
dent from the withdrawal of American Airlines, Continental,
and Northwest, as stated previously. The result is that United
Airlines is the only American carrier servicing the route. Air Pa-
cific, in which Qantas has a 20% holding, recently introduced a
Sydney-Fiji-San Francisco service. In July 1996, the Australian
and New Zealand governments announced a landmark agree-
ment creating a single domestic aviation market across the Tas-
man Sea which separates Australia and New Zealand.1 42 The
agreement, which does not affect the regulation of international
flights, will enable each country's airline to operate within the
140 Adam Bryant, USAir Delays Some Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, at D3.
141 Jacqueline Gallacher, A Question of Give and Take, AiRLINE Bus., June 1995,
at 54.
142 Mark Riley, Air NZ to Be Third Domestic Carrier, SYDNEY MORING HERALD, July
3, 1996, at 33.
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other's domestic market as part of the arrangement. 143 It is pro-
jected that the arrangement will stimulate the market which is
worth $5 billion (Australian dollars) and carries more than
thirty-one million passengers per year. 1" The "beyond rights"
between New Zealand and Australia, in which Air New Zealand
(Air NZ) seeks access to Brisbane Airport as a hub to its markets
in Southeast Asia and which, in the past, has been a source of
dispute between Qantas and Air NZ, will be negotiated sepa-
rately between the respective governments.1 45 Air NZ will also
purchase a 50% shareholding in Australia's second domestic
carrier, Ansett Airlines Ltd. 146
Air NZ remains a future competitor for Qantas. This is be-
cause Air NZ has entered into an arrangement with Ansett Inter-
national in the South Pacific region in partnership with the
American carrier United Airlines. Air NZ considers itself a
niche carrier for the Southwest Pacific, Australia, and the Pacific
Islands. Air NZ also recently announced that it will now seek to
purchase the 50% shareholding held by TNT in Ansett Air-
lines.1 47 The other principal shareholder is News Corporation,
owned by the Murdoch Group.1 4
One quarter of Air NZ's revenue is derived from the business
traveller with the balance coming from the leisure market.1 49
Air NZ has maintained a profitable profile for the last ten years
and ranks eleventh in the world in terms of net profits, having
announced for the third successive year a 36% growth in earn-
ings to reach $260.2 million (New Zealand dollars) in 1995.150
B. ANsErr AUSTRALIA AND ANSETT INTERNATIONAL
In November 1994, when Qantas Airlines announced weekly
flights to Vietnam as an important market for Australian busi-
ness, government, and tourism, Ansett Australia announced,
through its new entity Ansett International, expansion into Asia
with regular flights and travel incentive marketing schemes. In
143 Id.
-" Diane Stott, Air Fares May Fall After NZ Deal, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept.
20, 1996, at 13.
145 See Riley, supra note 142, at 33.
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1994 the airline established a profitable destination to Bali, with
weekly flights to Japan, China, and Vietnam. Following recent
discussions between Ansett International and Thai Interna-
tional, a broader alliance with Lufthansa and United Airlines
has been developed.
C. THE LUFrHANSA-UNITED-THm ALLIANCE
The creation of the new Lufthansa, United Airlines, and Thai
International alliance represents an immediate and competitive
challenge to Qantas-BA. A review of their main features follows.
1. Lufthansa
Lufthansa (LH), in preparation for privatization at the end of
1995, undertook a reduction program. In the first half of 1994,
LH announced a pre-tax profit of DM100 million ($63 mil-
lion).' 5 This result was in contrast to the deficit of DM221 mil-
lion recorded in the first half of 1993.152 The airline also
introduced a Frequent Flyer Program in 1993, acquiring over
one million members.1 53 LH rationalized the management
structure, reduced the general workforce by 17%, and increased
productivity by 11%.'- 4 The airline entered agreements to
purchase a 25% interest with the U.S. computer-based system
house EDS which operates System One CRS for Continental Air-
lines. 55 The objective was to create cost savings of about 20%
on its annual data processing fees.'5 6
LH entered a codesharing and marketing alliance with
United Airlines in May 1994.'1 7 The scheme covered fifty-two
codeshare destinations which had a significant impact on for-
ward bookings for LH in 1995. The agreement was predicted to
assist LH in expanding its North American market in which it
had previously suffered losses. 158 The fact that United Airlines is
employee-owned is consistent with LH's stated policy of offering
its employees a 20% share in the airline.1 59 The alliance fulfills











LH's global strategy without the financial ties BA faced with
USAir or Qantas. 160
LH and United Airlines held negotiations with Thai Interna-
tional in 1994. A marketing alliance with a cargo hub in Bang-
kok was a predicted outcome.1 61 The alliance would not be
LH's first entry into Asia, as it established a joint venture with
Air China in relation to a maintenance and a technical support
agreement with ModiLuft in India several years ago.1 62
2. United Airlines
United Airlines (UA) was not among the world's leading air-
lines in net profitability in 1994. However, in its ranking of total
revenue tonne km, it was first in the world; in carrying passen-
gers it was third; and in revenue passenger km it was also first.163
UA employees own 55% of the carrier in exchange for $4.9
billion in wage and work rule concessions. This record testifies
to its relative strength in the global airline market. UA is the last
American carrier on the Pacific route. UA shows no sign of
abandoning this market and is well positioned to establish its
alliances in Asia with Thai International Airways and in the Pa-
cific with Air NZ and Ansett International.
3. Thai Airways International Airlines
Thai Airways International's net profit of U.S. $171 million
ranked fourth in the world in 1 9 9 3 .1M It recently embarked on
a range of measures including rationalizing aircraft types and
engines previously ordered from fourteen different aircraft
manufacturers. 65 However, the airline still suffers from over ca-
pacity, poor management, and excessive interference by govern-
ment and the military.' 66
In 1994, Thai Airways launched Royal Orchid Plus, its new fre-
quent flyer program.1 67 Membership forecasts were expected to
be 50,000 but reached 200,000 within twelve months. 168 The air-
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sure in the Pacific and Australian markets. The alliance formed
with United Airlines in December 1993 was strengthened in
1994 with the coordination of schedules, frequent flyer pro-
grams, and inflight products.1 69 With no bilateral agreement
operating between the U.S. and Thailand, there is little possibil-
ity of codesharing arrangements in the near future. 170
Thai International faces competition from Cathay Pacific, Sin-
gapore Airlines, and Malaysian Airlines. 171 There is heavy dis-
counting by the major carriers on the trans-Pacific route. 172
Thai International may be forced to withdraw its carriers from
the route in favor of United Airlines if changes occur among its
other competitors in the Asian regional market. Concurrently,
the linkages being explored with Ansett Australia is timely given
its recent expansion into the Asian markets. The alliance be-
tween Thai International and Ansett is wide ranging. It will in-
clude codesharing, frequent flyer programs, and access to
Ansett's Australian domestic network as well as its wholly owned
travel agency, Traveland. This arrangement with Thai Interna-
tional may be a difficult issue for Ansett Australia as it enjoys a
successful relationship with Singapore Airlines, a major competi-
tor for Thai International in the Asian market.
D. QANTAS IN A GLOBAL COMPETITIVE MARKET
Qantas is a recognized brand name known domestically and
internationally for airline safety, security, and customer service.
As an international airline, it has a significant presence on the
Sydney-London route, particularly through the BA alliance, and
on the Sydney-Los Angeles and North American routes through
its alliance with American Airlines. Qantas has gained access to
the Asian markets with linkages to Japan, Hong Kong, China,
Malaysia, Thailand, and, more recently, Vietnam. It has estab-
lished alliances and frequent flyer programs with BA, Scandina-
vian Air Services (SAS), and Canada Air International. 173
Qantas's alliance with BA has forced it to restructure its manage-
ment and organizational base during 1993-1994 in time for
privatization which, at the time of this writing, has only recently
been completed.1 74
169 Id. at 41-42.
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Yet Qantas faces a dilemma. It holds a 20% equity in Air NZ
which has alliances with Air Canada (joint marketing, codeshar-
ing, and FFPs), Delta (FFP cross participation), Japan Airlines
(joint weekly flights and FFP participation), Korean Air
(codesharing and block space agreement), and Lufthansa (FFP
participation), thus making Air NZ a direct competitor. This is
especially so following the creation of the "single aviation mar-
ket" between Australia and New Zealand on November 1, 1996,
referred to earlier in this Essay. 175
The other threat is Ansett Australia. It represents a domestic
as well as an international challenge. Ansett has enjoyed an alli-
ance with Lufthansa in sales agencies for the Ansett domestic
sector since 1993. It has also enjoyed alliances since 1993 with
Malaysian Airlines in frequent flyer program participation and
with United Airlines in codesharing. It seems clear that Ansett
Australia, Thai International, and Lufthansa will continue to en-
hance their relationship, giving them a global presence in the
future.
X. CONCLUSION
Asia is Australia's most important market and is likely to re-
main so in the future.1 76 Qantas is Australia's principal interna-
tional carrier and faces significant competition from other
carriers in the region. This Essay has suggested that the emer-
gence of airline alliances requires airline board members and
executives to formulate policies and strategies on a global basis.
Finding suitable and profitable partners is a major challenge. It
is clear that Qantas acquired a formidable alliance partner in
BA. There are critics, nevertheless, including Sir James Leslie,
the previous chairman of Qantas, who believes that BA will be-
come the dominant partner given the 49% of overseas institu-
tional ownership following Qantas's recent public float.
Whether Qantas fulfills its mission as a global carrier or one
which only has a limited presence in the Asia Pacific Region re-
mains a matter for future analysis.
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